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and authorizes the taking or damage to private property. The court
concluded that regardless of whether the trial court relied upon the
Illinois Municipal Code, it was applicable to this administrative review.
The court would only overturn the Commission's decision if proven it
was not supported by substantial evidence.
The landowners also argued that sections 8-406, 8-503, and 8-509
of the Act seem to refer only to takings of property for permanent facilities, and not to temporary easements for testing purposes. The
court agreed that there was no express authority under the Act for the
Commission to give a utility authority to condemn for temporary
easements in order to perform tests. However, in interpreting the legislation, it gave deference to the Commission.
The court also relied on Wilcox v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (also
concerning the use of eminent domain) where the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the Commission's order issued under the "Gas Act."
The supreme court permitted condemnation for underground gas
storage even though the project was experimental.
Therefore, considering the deference given to the Commission,
the construction the supreme court gave to the Gas Act, and the common sense of permitting condemnation to test the quality of a water
source before making permanent facilities, the court held that the
temporary testing wells, and the installation of the piezometers and
other testing devices were within the meaning of sections 8-503 and 8509 of the Act. The Commission properly denied landowners' motion
to dismiss CIWC's petition for failure to set forth grounds for relief.
Melody Divine

Ryan v. Stonehedge, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 497 (IMI. App. Ct. 1997) (holding
that a court is not required to find that a site is contaminated before it
can conclude that the site contaminated groundwater in violation of
the Environmental Protection Act).
The People of the State of Illinois filed a three-count complaint
against the Defendant, Stonehedge, Inc., alleging that deicing salt
stored on Stonehedge's property leaked into the area's groundwater
supply, contaminating it. The trial court granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all three counts. The Plaintiff appealed.
In fall 1988, Stonehedge began storing deicing salt on its property
and continued to store salt until approximately Fall 1992. Stonehedge
stored the deicing salt on the ground, without a concrete pad or cover.
In 1992, tests by the McHenry County Department of Health revealed
high chloride levels in groundwater wells adjacent to the site where
Stonehedge, Inc. stored the deicing salt.
Count I of the Plaintiffs complaint alleged that Stonehedge's discharge of salt into the groundwater violated sections 12(a) and 12(d)
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of the Environmental Protection Act ("Act"). The Plaintiff alleged that
Stonehedge only contaminated private wells. Although the Act does
apply to groundwater, it only applies to the State's groundwater.
Therefore, because the Plaintiffs complaint did not allege that Stonehedge polluted the State's groundwater, the court held that section 12
of the Act did not apply in this case.
Stonehedge argued that because the Plaintiff did not bring forth
evidence that the site was contaminated, the court could not conclude
that Stonehedge had contaminated the groundwater. However, the
trial court did not grant summary judgment on this basis. The Plaintiffs complaint did not allege that the Stonehedge storage site was
contaminated. The complaint alleged that the deicing salt leaked into
the groundwater, contaminating it. The court held that the Plaintiff
did not need to produce evidence that the Stonehedge site was contaminated to prove the merits of the action.
Lastly, Stonehedge argued that the Plaintiff failed to follow testing
procedures used to demonstrate noncompliance with the groundwater
standard. The court found that the Illinois Water Well Construction
Code ('Well Code") applied in this instance. Under this section, a water well can be monitored for groundwater quality if a construction report has been filed with the Department of Health, or if the well meets
the Illinois Water Well Construction Code. According to the Well
Code, "[wlells constructed prior to the adoption of this Part may not
meet the criteria established. When a well is to undergo modification,
reconstruction, or repair, the work shall include those changes necessary to make the well conform to this Part." The court rejected Plaintiffs argument that its wells were "grandfathered" into compliance
with the Well Code. Instead, the court found that the purpose of the
statute was to acknowledge that the wells in existence at the time the
Well Code was enacted did not have to meet the Well Code requirements unless or until they were modified. The wells at issue were
never modified. Accordingly, the wells did not meet the Well Code's
requirements for testing contaminated groundwater. Therefore, the
Plaintiffs groundwater samples could not be used to determine
whether the groundwater in those wells was contaminated. Consequently, the court held that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was proper concerning count I.
Count II alleged that by allowing the salt to leak through the
ground, Stonehedge altered the physical, chemical, and biological
qualities of the water so as to render it unfit for use as potable water
under the public water supply regulations. The Plaintiffs complaint in
this count also depended on the groundwater samples taken from the
wells that the court deemed not in compliance with the Well Code.
Therefore, the court held that summary judgment was properly
granted regarding count II.
Count III alleged that Stonehedge was in violation of the Act by
depositing at least 50,000 pounds of deicing salt within 200 feet of two
existing potable water supply wells, which qualified it as a new poten-
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tial secondary source. A potential secondary source is a unit, facility,
or site that stores or accumulates at any time more than 50,000 pounds
of any deicing agent. The Plaintiff maintained that Stonehedge failed
to bring forth evidence that it had never stored more than 50,000
pounds on its site. The court agreed that the record lacked any such
evidence. Therefore, the court found that the Plaintiffs allegations as
to count III remained a question of fact that precluded summary
judgment. The court held that the trial court's grant regarding count
III was erroneous and reversed. The court affirmed the trial court's
judgment in part, reversed in part, and the cause was remanded.
Lori Asher

MARYLAND
Gwynn v. Oursler, 712 A.2d 1072 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (holding
that where a right-of-way to navigable water is created, and the party's
intent is ambiguous, the easement alone does not constitute a riparian
right to construct a dock).
This appeal arose from a property dispute originating in 1957.
The Oursler and Gwynn properties bordered one another. In 1957,
both families created a deed for a perpetual right-of-way. The easement, a 20 foot-wide strip, ran along the property line separating the
two lots and led to both the road on one side and the river on the
other. When the deed was executed, a pier was located at the end of
the right-of-way leading into the Patuxent River. Due to natural disasters, the pier was destroyed and rebuilt, but not in the same location as
when the original deed was issued. After a potential injunction, the
Ourslers removed and rebuilt the pier, far removed from the right-ofway.
The Gwynns applied for a permit to construct a new pier at the
end of the right-of-way. The county Board of Commissioners would
not issue a permit until a decision from the circuit court was granted.
The Gwynns filed suit claiming riparian right-of-way across the Oursler
land. The trial court ruled that the creators of the right-of-way lacked
the intent to convey riparian rights (and therefore gave no authority to
construct a pier). In general, a right-of-way leading to the shore of a
navigable river did not create a riparian right. The trial court determined that the right-of-way was intended "only to provide access to the
various owners of the dominant estates to the road," not to the river.
The circuit court reversed. The Ourslers appealed.
Two issues were presented on appeal. First, "does an easement for
ingress and egress only to the shore of a navigable river entitle the
owner of the dominant estate to construct a pier at the end of the
easement?" Second, "[w]as the trial court's evidentiary finding that
the deed did not intend that the right-of-way include a pier clearly er-

